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Abstract
We employ the difference-in-difference framework to examine households’ access to
credit as a possible transmission channel of the global financial crisis to child labour
in Tanzania. To deal with the endogeneity of access to credit, we propose a new in-
strument that considers the regional concentration of available micro-finance institu-
tions and the number of households’ assets. Our instrument incorporates information
on both demand and supply sides of credit access irrespective of whether a house-
hold has actually received credit. The empirical results reveal that a negative shock on
credit-recipient households is associated with a significant increase in child labour in
Tanzania.
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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis that burst in 2008 affecting economies worldwide has had
serious social effects. More specifically, concerns have been raised on its impact on
vulnerable groups (women and children). This paper investigates the extent to which
the global financial crisis has affected child labour in the context of Tanzania. In partic-
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ular, we investigate the extent to which a negative shock on credit-recipient households
led to an increase in child labour. Indeed, financial shocks may distort household’s de-
cision at the expense of vulnerable groups, pushing households to resort to child labour
to offset the loss of ‘income’. Worryingly, unlike transitory or idiosyncratic shocks
(loss of crops to insect, fire, droughts,floods, etc.), shocks such as the global financial
crisis cannot be insured against within a community- which exacerbates the issue even
further.
Although several theoretical frameworks have attempted to highlight the determinants
of child labour, perhaps the unitarian family model (see Becker (1964))-later devel-
oped by Becker and Murphy (1996) - is best suited to explaining the role of credit
constraint on child labour. The main conclusion is that child labour creates a trade-off
between current and future income and, thus, access to credit can help to explain the
prevalence of child labour. Similarly, the permanent income hypothesis and consump-
tion smoothing theory (see Zeldes (1989); Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997); Morduch
(1994); among others) implies that the lack of buffer stocks or a credit constraint can
lead households to use child labour as a means of offsetting income shocks.
On the empirical front, several studies have explored the effect of economic shocks on
child labour in developing countries (see for example, Blanco et al. (2006); Guarcello
et al. (2010)). Most of these studies suggest that children in households that suffer
from an economic shock are more likely to participate in child labour. Other studies
(see Dehejia and Gatti (2002); Guarcello et al. (2010)) have also examined how bor-
rowing constraints affect child labour. The reported evidence is consistent with credit
constraints being associated with higher levels of child labour. Within the context of
Tanzania, the focus of the present study, Beegle et al. (2006) finds that income shocks
lead to an increase in child labour but that household asset holding can mitigate this
effect.
The present study contributes to the literature on the following ways. First, there are no
studies that have analysed the impact of the recent global financial crisis on child labour
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in Tanzania; a country that has been fighting child labour for a long time. Following
the global shock, credit constraints to both individuals and businesses became harsher
in Tanzania with no sign of recovery until 2012, see Fig. 1.
Figure 1: Credit to Tanzanian private sector: Annual growth rate % (2007Q3 − 2012Q1)
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Quarterly Economic Bulletins 2007-2012
Second, we exploit the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock to address a ma-
jor shortcoming in other studies that use self-reported incidences of shocks. Third, we
adopt a difference-in-difference DiD methodology which allows us to compare house-
holds that were credit recipients before the crisis with households that were not re-
cipients of credit either prior to the crisis or in its immediate aftermath. Fourth, we
take into account the important issue of endogeneity in access to credit. Indeed, this
study introduces a new instrument that accounts for both supply and demand sides of
credit. More specifically, our proposed instrument takes into account the regional con-
centration of available micro-finance institutions and the number household assets. The
remainder of this paper is as follows: section 2 presents the dataset; section 3 outlines
our econometric methodology; section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5
concludes.
2. The Dataset
We use data from the Tanzanian National Panel Survey (TNPS) conducted by the Tan-
zanian National Bureau of Statistics. The analysis is based on data from the TNPS
for households observed in two periods: a pre-financial crisis period 2008/2009 and a
crisis period 2010/2011. Households are asked whether they have applied for credit
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and, if they have, what they used the credit for. Unfortunately, no information on
rejected applications is collected and only those with successful applications are ob-
served. In relation to the sample used in this study, the data includes information on
3,280 households, 6% of which are credit recipients. Attrition does not seem to be a
concern since that about 97% of period one households were also present in period
two. Table 1 presents the main characteristics of children aged 6 to 16 and the house-
holds in which they were located in 2008/2009. For the DiD analysis reported later,
the treatment group is comprised of children aged 6 to 16 whose households received
credit in 2008/2009 while the control group is formed by children from households that
neither received credit in 2008/2009 nor in 2010/2011. Table 1 indicates that children
in the credit never-recipient group were equally likely to attend school than children
belonging to credit recipient households. However, they are significantly less likely to
join the labour market. Although the same pattern can be observed in both the overall
sample and the rural sample, the size of the reported effects tend to be higher in the
rural sample. There is no significant difference between these groups in terms of their
mean age. However, there do seem to be significant gender effects: for the overall
sample 50% of children in the never-recipient group are girls compared to 55% in the
credit recipient group, while the equivalent figures for the rural sample are 51% and
59% respectively. These reported differences in gender are also statistically significant
across the control and treatment groups analysed.
3. Empirical Methodology
This study uses a difference-in-difference (DiD) technique to compare households that
were credit recipients before the crisis with never-recipient households. The DiD esti-
mator will capture the differential effect of the crisis on children from the credit recipi-
ent households relative to children in non-recipient households. To control for observ-
ables, we include child and household characteristics as follows.
Yit = β0 + β1Crediti + β2Crisist + β3Crediti.Crisist + φXi + it (1)
Where Yit is the outcome of interest; Crediti is a dummy variable that takes the value
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Table 1: Characteristics of children aged 6 to 16 and of their households in 2008/2009 by credit status of the
household
Overall sample Rural sample
Control Treat Diff Control Treat Diff
Child a b a-b c d c-d
childwork 0.08 0.11 -0.02*** 0.12 0.18 -0.06***
childstudy 0.97 0.96 0.00 0.96 0.93 0.02
female 0.50 0.55 -0.05*** 0.51 0.59 -0.08***
age 10.35 10.17 0.18 10.29 10.24 0.05
Household
HH size 6.43 7.04 -0.62*** 6.63 6.76 -0.12
members under 18 9.35 11.40 -2.046*** 8.08 8.61 -0.53***
female head 0.23 0.19 0.04*** 0.22 0.18 0.04***
married head 0.71 0.72 -0.01 0.73 0.82 -0.1***
age head 46.58 43.69 2.9*** 46.90 44.10 2.80***
parent educ 0.40 0.43 -0.04*** 0.35 0.39 -0.04
inc HH 7.72 10.53 -2.81*** 6.08 9.79 -3.7***
Region
rural 0.64 0.58 0.06*** - - -
HDI 0.51 0.53 -0.01*** 0.48 0.47 0.01***
micro.asset 0.05 0.09 -0.04*** 0.05 0.05 0.00***
Obs. 10334 842 6582 500
Sample: Children 6 to 16 years of age in the 2008/2009 round the Tanzanian National Panel Survey. Non-recipients includes households
that did not receive credit in period I nor in period II.∗∗∗ denotes significant at 0.01 significance level. HDI is the Human Development Index computed by the UNDP.
5
of one if the child belongs to a household that received credit in period I (treatment
group) and zero if the child belongs to a household that did not receive credit in period
II (control group); Crisist is a dummy that takes the value of one for period I (post-
treatment) and zero for period I (pre-treatment) and Crediti.Crisist is an interaction
term that takes the value one only for the treatment group in the post-treatment (crisis)
period. The coefficient of β3 yields the DiD estimator. Xi is a series of control variables
related to child and household characteristics. These are gender and age of the child, a
dummy for being in a rural area, the number of household members, a dummy variable
indicating whether the head of household is a female, a dummy variable that reflects
whether the head of household is uneducated, household income and a regional hu-
man development index (HDI). The outcome variables yit represents either child work
(childwork) or child study (childstudy).
3.1. Estimation issues
The DiD produces unbiased estimates under the condition that both treatment and con-
trol groups reacted to the shock in a similar way, except for the behaviour associated
to the change in access to credit. This assumption arguably may fail if credit recipients
are different from non-recipients on some unobservable variables; that is, if house-
holds are selected into signing up for a loan. Thus, DiD estimates are likely to be
biased downward. Therefore, to avoid possible endogeneity, we instrument for those
who belong to the credit recipient group. Following Alcaraz et al. (2012), we first es-
timate a probit model of the endogenous variable credit on the proposed instrument to
obtain the predicted value of credit (credit.hat). Then, the predicted value is used in a
two stages least squares (2SLS) framework to estimate the effect of the financial crisis
on children’s work and schooling through household access to credit. This gives an
exactly identified system (two endogenous variables credit and credit.crisis and two
instruments credit.hat and credit.hat.crisis).
3.2. Household access to credit: A new instrument
Existing access to credit in the literature include the ratio of private credit issued by
banks to GDP (Dehejia and Gatti, 2002), the value of household collateralizable assets
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(Beegle et al., 2003), the presence of a commercial bank in the community(Ersado,
2005), actual loan acquiring (Arun et al., 2006), credit limit (Diagne, 1999). Other
studies such as Field and Torero (2006) propose a link between holding housing eq-
uity and the likelihood of having access to credit. In this context, macro measures of
credit access may be not useful to policy makers in the sense that they are more likely
to be affected by the overall development status of the country. Similarly, using the
presence of commercial banks in a region may not be a good measure of household
access to credit as these banks might not have the products that serve poor household
needs. Other measures such as the total value of household assets is more likely to
be associated with wealth effects and so related to child labour decisions. In addition,
measures that rely on either the actual loan uptake, or dichotomous membership in a
microcredit organisation, obviously, suffer from selection problems. Accordingly, the
current study proposes a new instrument that overcomes these shortcomings.
We introduce a new micro.asset index as an instrument for the extent to which a house-
hold has access to credit. This is a composite and continuous index that takes any
value between zero and one. It combines the number of microfinance institutions in
the region where a household lives multiplied by the number of assets possessed by a
household, which can be used as collateral to borrow. The index has a lower bound
of zero, which represents no access to credit, and as the index goes to one it implies
higher access to credit.1.
The proposed micro.asset index reflects both demand and supply considerations related
to credit accessibility irrespective of whether a household has an actual loan2. By utiliz-
1The new micro.asset index can be described as follows: micro.asseti = Ai × Mi, where Ai =
1
A
∑A=13
a=1 asseta and Mi =
1
M
∑M=41
m=1 microm. Accordingly, micro.asseti is the value of the index for house-
hold i; Ai is the ratio of the number of collateralizable assets that household i possess to the total number
of assets and Mi is the proportional of the regional coverage of microfinance institution exist in which the
household resides, and M = 41 is the total number of microfinance institutions that are members of the
Tanzanian Association of Microfinance Institutions (TAMFI, 2012) as of 2011/2012.
2Many authors have underlined this fact. For example, Diagne (1999) argues that household demand for
credit cannot be modelled separately from its supply and suggests that household access to credit depends
on both the lender and borrowers characteristics and actions. Moreover, Quach et al. (2005) argue that what
actually matters is the supply of credit and therefore, a good instrumental variable must be those which well
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ing information on the regional coverage of microfinance institutions, the micro.asset
index not only reflects the supply side of credit access but, more importantly, draws
on how information about available credit products may be disseminated. Since that
the majority of households in Tanznia have not been banking before (80%), nor have
a bank account (70%), this would reflect financial illiteracy without violating the ex-
ogeneity requirment. On the demand side, having assets to borrow against is a basic
requirement of the microfinance instiutions in Tanzania3. The asset component of the
index counts the number of assets in the household and not their value and so we ar-
gue it will not be a pure wealth effect, which will be correlated with the child labour
decision.
Figure 2: Distribution of micro.asset index and microfinance regional coverage
Source: Author’s colaboration
Figure 2 plots the micro.asset index along with the regional distribution of microfi-
nance institutions. It shows that those who live in regions with higher numbers of
micro-finance institutions have better higher opportunities to access credit. However,
a possible concern is a potential correlation between micro-credit coverage in a re-
gion and the level of development of households living in that region. Consequently,
describe the characteristics of the lender. They emphasize on the fact that lender characteristics influence the
supply of credit without having a direct household welfare
3The lack of collateral is the key reasons for which households did not apply for credit in Guarcello
et al. (2010).
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we control for regional Human Development Index (HDI) extracted from the Tanzania
socio-economic database (TSED, 2002).
4. Empirical Results
The DiD approach examines the effect of a negative shock on access to credit on child
labour and school attendance. Specifically, the analysis captures the differential effect
of the crisis on children from credit recipient households relative to children in non-
recipient households4. The data indicates about a 40% drop in the average value of
loans (2005 prices) received by Tanzanian households between period I (2008/2009)
and period II (2009/2010). This reduction in the average values of loans can be directly
attributed to the global financial crisis where lenders became more reluctant to lend
(formal credit). A similar effect is expected to restrict informal sources of credit, such
as borrowing from a friend, and thus increase the burden on households.
4.1. Differences-in-differences estimates
Table 2 presents the mean values of the main outcomes for both control and treatment
groups in both period I (2008/2009) and period II (2010/2011). The DiD estimator is
equal to the difference between the treatment and control groups, and offers an esti-
mate of the effect of access to credit on child labour and schooling. Defining period I
(2008/2009) as a baseline, 8.4% of children in the control group were working while the
equivalent figure for the treatment group was 10.8%. Moving to period II (2010/2011),
the incidence of child labour increased for both groups. In particular, the incidence of
child labour increased by 8.6 and 19.8 percentage points in the control and treatment
groups respectively. The simple DiD estimator is therefore equal to 11.2 percentage
points, which is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. This implies that
on average all households have responded to the shock to credit access arising from the
global financial crisis by increasing the supply of child labour. However the response
of the treatment group is significantly larger than the control group, implying these
4A child is considered to be working if in the week previous to the survey he or she participated in some
type of economic activity for at least one hour, with or without pay.
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households suffered most from restrictions arising from the crisis on credit.
A similar pattern of response is found for the school attendance variable. On average
school drop-outs increased for both groups but the increase was larger for the treatment
group than for the control group: equivalent to 6.6 percentage points for the treatment
group compared to only 2 percentage points for the control group. The DiD analy-
sis therefore suggests that children belonging to credit-recipient households (treatment
group) were 4.6% more likely to drop out from school after the shock compared to
children belonging to credit never-recipient households (control group). This finding
suggests that the larger reduction in school attendance found for the treatment group
was mostly likely due to changes in credit conditions following the crisis. The effect is
statistically significant at the 5% significance level.
Table 2: Difference in difference estimations
Child work Period I Period II Dif
Control 0.084 0.17 0.086
Treatment 0.108 0.306 0.198
Dif 0.045** 0.136*** 0.112***
SE (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
Child study
Control 0.967 0.947 -0.02
Treatment 0.962 0.896 -0.066
Dif -0.006 -0.052*** -0.046***
SE (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Note: The treatment group is composed of children aged 6 to 16 in period I that belong to house-
holds that declared receiving credit in period I. The control group is composed of children aged 6
to 16 in period I that did not receive credit in period I nor in period II. Number of children: 842
for the treatment group and 10465 for the control group.
Standard errors in parentheses.∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
In addition to the simple DiD analysis reported above, we also consider the difference
between treatment and control groups but allowing for the influence of a number of
other observable characteristics. Therefore, Table 3 reports linear regression estimates
for four different specifications, each of which includes additional controls. The left
hand side panel presents the DiD estimates of the effect of credit on the probability that
a child works, while the DiD estimates of the effect of credit on the probability that
a child will remain in school are presented in the right hand panel in the same table.
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Columns (1) and (5) correspond to the case where no additional controls are included,
and therefore the estimates here coincide with those reported in Table 2. Columns (2)
and (6) include a number of child and household characteristics, household income is
controlled for in columns (3) and (7), and finally whether the child belongs to a rural
family is included in columns (4) and (8). The highlighted interaction term credit.crisis
is the main coefficient of interest, which shows the DiD estimate of the effect of the cri-
sis on credit access between treatment and control groups.
Looking first at the child labour outcome, the estimated coefficient of the interaction
term credit.crisis is positive and statistically significant at 1% significance level in all
specifications. The results reported in columns (1) to (4) suggest suggest that in re-
sponse to the credit squeeze following the global financial crisis children in Tanzania
were 10% more likely to participate in the labour market. With respect to the school
attendance, on the other hand, the highlighted coefficient is negative and statistically
significant. Depending on the specification used therefore children are between 4.6%
(column 5) and 2.7% (column 8) more likely to drop out of school in response to a
credit squeeze following the crisis. Tanzanian households, therefore, were more likely
to react to having less credit as a consequence of the global financial crisis by taking
their children out of school and sending them to work. This conclusion supports the
simple DiD findings reported in Table 2. Similar findings are reported for Guatemala,
where households that were hit by shocks increased children’s labour supply and re-
duced children’s school attendance (Guarcello et al., 2010). In this context, Beegle
et al. (2003) also show that households in Tanzania tend to respond to transitory in-
come shocks by increasing child labour.
The coefficients of the other variables reported in Table 3 seem to be consistent with
prior expectations. A child is more likely to work and drop-out from school if she is
a girl, older, lives in a big family, or lives in a rural area. Across all specifications
reported in Table 3, age was a significant factor in predicting child labour and school
attendance. Similarly, a child is less likely to join the labour market and drop-out from
school if the household head is married or lives with an older household head. Finally,
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Table 3: DiD results for child labour and school attendance
Dep. Var.: Child Labour Dep. Var.: School Attendence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
crisis 0.086*** 0.080*** 0.094*** 0.073*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
credit 0.024** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.032*** -0.006 -0.014* -0.016** -0.014*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
credit.crisis 0.112*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.095*** -0.046*** -0.028** -0.033** -0.027**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
female 0.015*** 0.007 0.015*** -0.010*** -0.006* -0.010***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
age 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HH size 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
siblings -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female head -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 0.004 0.009 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
married head -0.082*** -0.076*** -0.081*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
age head -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
parent educ -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.028*** -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
inc HH -0.003*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
rural 0.090*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.003)
cons. 0.084*** -0.030*** -0.007 -0.088*** 0.967*** 1.118*** 1.101*** 1.129***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
N 23471 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370
R2 0.026 0.079 0.085 0.094 0.006 0.086 0.086 0.089
Sample: Children aged 6 to 16 in period I 2008/2009. The table presents the Linear Probability estimation of Equation 1. Credit is a dummy equal to one if the child belongs to a household
that in period I (2008/2009) declared receiving credit (treatment group), and it is equal to zero if the child belongs to a household that did not receive credit in period I (2008/2009) nor in
period II (2010/2011) (control group). Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for period II (2010/2011) and zero for period I (2008/2009). The coefficient on interaction term
credit.crisis is the DiD estimate of the impact on the outcome variables (child labour and school attendance) of the negative shock on access to credit due to the global recession aftermath
the global economic crisis in 2008. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, ** and * denotes significant coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level
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the child is less likely to join the labour market if the parents are educated.
4.2. Instrumental variables specification
The first panel of Table 4 presents the results of the credit choice probit model. The
coefficient of micro.asset is positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance
level, indicating the more micro finance institutions working within the region and the
more assets in the household’s possession the higher is the probability of receiving
credit.
Table 4 presents the first stage results from the 2SLS estimation. The bottom panel
of the table also presents results from different tests assessing the relevance of our
instruments: the first-stage F-statistic for the significance of the instruments and the
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald statistic for weak identification. As explained earlier,
Equation 1 includes two right hand endogenous variables. These are the credit variable
and the interaction term credit.crisis. Accordingly, Table 4 reports results for the first
stage associated with the endogenous variable credit, as well as for the first stage of the
interaction term credit.crisis. The first stage estimates are reported in the second and
third panels of Table 4 respectively. The coefficients of credit.hat from the first stage
of credit and of credit.hat.crisis from the first stage of credit.crisis are statistically
significant and have the correct sign in both cases.
Finally, instrumental variable estimates are presented in Table 5, which show a large
and significant effect of credit on the incidence of child labour. When not controlling
for household labour income or a development index (HDI), the increase in the prob-
ability of child labour in response to a decrease in credit access arising from the crisis
is 39.6 percentage points higher (column 1). This estimate increases to 70 percentage
points when all the additional controls are included (column 3). The higher impact
suggested by the IV estimates compared to the OLS results may be partly explained
by the endogeniety issue. Similarly, the instrumental variable estimates show strong
evidence of the financial crisis having a significant effect on child labour. However,
13
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Table 5: Instrumental variables estimation
Dep. Var.: Child Labour Dep. Var.: Child Study
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
crisis 0.058*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.056*** -0.007 -0.004 0.003 -0.012
(0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
credit -0.128 -0.234*** -0.057 -0.075 0.094** 0.172*** 0.067* 0.071
(0.087) (0.073) (0.067) (0.080) (0.048) (0.044) (0.039) (0.049)
credit.crisis 0.396* 0.712*** 0.729*** 0.416*** -0.227** -0.313*** -0.369*** -0.220***
(0.204) (0.077) (0.086) (0.139) (0.098) (0.060) (0.062) (0.079)
female 0.013** 0.009* 0.004 0.007 -0.006* -0.007** -0.005 -0.007*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
age 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
HH size 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
siblings -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female head -0.013* -0.013* -0.015** -0.010 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
married head -0.086*** -0.062*** -0.067*** -0.058*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
age head -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
parent educ -0.036*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.007* -0.005 -0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HDI -0.522*** 0.145***
(0.029) (0.022)
inc HH -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
cons -0.012 0.023 0.243*** -0.049*** 1.105*** 1.093*** 1.023*** 1.112***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011)
N 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370 23370
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.121 0.027 0.161 0.067 0.099 0.064 0.119
Note: Second stage instrumental variables estimations of Equation 1. First stage results presented in Table 4. The coefficients on the interaction term credit.crisis indicate the effect of the negative
shock on access to credit on the variables of interest (child labour and school attendance). Credit is a dummy equal to one if the child belongs to a household that in period I (2008/2009) declared
receiving credit (treatment group), and it is equal to zero if the child belongs to a household that did not receive credit in period I (2008/2009( nor in period II (2010/2011) (control group). Crisis is
a dummy variable that takes the value one for period I (2008/2009) and zero for period II (2010/2011). The HDI corresponds to the UNDP Human Development Index.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
15
access to credit per se does not seem to be statistically significant except in model (2).
Interestingly some of the IV results reported in Table 5 are not in line with the results
reported earlier in Table 3. This applies most notably to the size and significance of the
effects associated with access to credit, the crisis and the interaction term. However,
elsewhere there are similarities in the pattern of results found in both the OLS and IV
estimates. For example, a child is less likely to work if she is female, older or lives
in a big size family. The child is less likely to work if she has more siblings or if the
household head is female, married, older or educated. Finally, the estimated coefficient
for the regional HDI is negative and statistically significant at the 1% significance level.
This indicates that children in more developed areas are less likely to join the labour
market.
With respect to school attendance, there is a large and significant reduction in the prob-
ability that the child goes to school as a consequence of the credit shortage. Without
household income and development measures as controls, the effect of the shortage
of credit is estimated to be of 22.7 percentage points. The results remain around 30
percentage point when adding more controls. Remarkably, the magnitude of the coef-
ficients for school attendance is much smaller as compared to the probability of child
work, even after correcting for endogeneity. This observation may be partially ex-
plained by two separate considerations. First, the Tanzanian legislation system imposes
a compulsory education level while does not totally prohibit child work. Second, chil-
dren may have joined the labour market without necessarily dropping out from school.
Similar findings have been reported elsewhere in the literature. Ravallion and Wodon
(2000) and Deb and Rosati (2002), for example, found that schooling and child labour
are not one to one substitutes. Other studies such as Khanam (2010) has shown that
there is a trade-off between child labour and schooling.
In a related context, an early study by Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999) used
household data from Tanzania and found a trade-off between hours of work and study.
However, their results show that a child’s allocation of time between these two dif-
16
ferent activities is affected by both household and community characteristics, and that
working hours tended to be more responsive than study hours. What is more, access
to credit is shown to be positive and statistically significant, indicating that access to
credit by households is associated with an increase in the probability of children going
to school. In particular, a child is unlikely to attend school if she is female, older or
lives in a big family. Additionally, a child is less likely to drop-out from school if she
has more siblings or if the household head is female, married or older.
4.3. Robustness check
In order to check the robustness of the instrumental variable estimates reported in Ta-
ble 5, instrumental variable estimates are reported for a number of different samples:
(i) based on the age of the child, where the sample is restricted to children aged 8 and
above; (ii) based on separate rural and urban samples; and (iii) based on a sample of
households above and below the national poverty line.
Table 6 shows the IV estimates for children age 8-16. The results from this restricted
sample match those of the full sample, confirming a positive effect of access to credit
during the crisis on child labour and a negative effect on school attendance. However,
in contrast to the full sample results the magnitude of these two effects are now much
more similar. This may indicate that the likelihood of dropping out of school when
joining the labour market increases as the child gets older, especially in crisis times.
Given child labour is prominent feature in rural communities in developing countries,
it is useful to assess the extent to which the IV results reported in Table 5 are the result
of children living in rural households. Accordingly, Table 6 show separate IV esti-
mates for children who belong to households located in rural areas and those who live
in urban areas. As can be seen from the table, the results for rural areas are similar to
the results reported in Table 5 for the full sample. However, the corresponding results
for urban areas are oppositely signed and statistically insignificant. This suggests the
effect on child labour of access to credit during the crisis was mainly due to its effect
17
Table 6: IV estimations for a number of selected sub-samples: Coefficients on the interaction term
credit.crisis
Dep. Var.: Child Labour Dep. Var.: Child Study N
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Full 0.396* 0.712*** 0.729*** 0.416*** -0.227** -0.313*** -0.369*** -0.220*** 23370
(0.204) (0.077) (0.086) (0.139) (0.098) (0.060) (0.062) (0.079)
8-16 0.881 0.821*** 0.694*** 0.816*** -0.552* -0.494*** -0.574*** -0.637*** 17319
(0.646) (0.095) (0.106) (0.108) (0.310) (0.075) (0.096) (0.095)
Rural 0.133 0.914*** 0.448 0.093 -0.891** -0.581*** -0.695*** -0.653*** 15602
(0.424) (0.101) (1.824) (0.298) (0.433) (0.083) (0.112) (0.222)
Urban -0.170 -0.031 -0.062 -0.052 0.107** 0.067 0.069 0.065 7768
(0.120) (0.079) (0.080) (0.077) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.044)
Above 0.876*** 0.780*** 0.601*** -0.198** -0.166*** -0.174*** 13244
(0.159) (0.100) (0.101) - (0.081) (0.061) (0.062)
Below -0.100 0.401*** 0.752 -0.403 -0.337*** -0.384 10126
(0.348) (0.116) (0.853) (0.569) (0.124) (1.672)
Region No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
income No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
HDI No No Yes No No No Yes No
Month No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies were included for 14 and most coefficients were statistically significant.∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
on children living in rural communities, where access to credit tends to be lower in
any case. The estimates reported in Table 6 suggest that in rural communities access
to credit during a crisis could increase child labour by as much as 90 percentage points
depending on whether monthly control variables are included in the specification.
The estimates reported in Table 6 for school attendance also suggest that access to
credit during the crisis affected children in rural households more than children in ur-
ban households. Specifically children living in rural households are much more likely
to experience a reduction in school attendance as a result of the credit squeeze than
children living in urban areas. This result is likely to be due in part to differences in
schooling costs. Specifically with schooling costs being higher in rural areas it implies
that any restriction on credit arising from a crisis is likely to lead to a greater tightening
of household budget constraints in rural areas. Consequently children in rural house-
holds are, other things being equal, more likely to have to work to offset s worsening
of the household budget constraint.
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Finally Table 6 shows IV estimates based on separate samples of households who are
above and below the poverty line respectively. Interestingly, a significant credit access
effects during the crisis is only consistently found for children living in households
with income levels above the poverty line. Moreover, the estimated effect tends to be
larger in these households than for children living in households below the poverty
line. This suggests a threshold above which credit access might be a helpful policy
tool to combat child labour. However, below that threshold, the credit access might not
be enough as the poverty effect will dominate the relationship and household may still
send their children to work.
5. Conclusion
In contrast to the existing literature where self reported shocks are used to examine
household behaviour, this study uses the global financial crisis as an exogenous event
to consider the effect on household decisions related to child labour and school at-
tendances through an access to credit channel. The study finds empirical evidence of
households responding to a negative shock to credit by increasing the likelihood of
child labour and reducing the likelihood of school attendance. Given the magnitude
of the response is different for child labour and school attendance decisions the data
suggests that the two decisions are not mutually exclusive. However, the results do
suggest households in Tanzania use borrowing as a mechanism to relax income con-
strained budgets and that during a crisis they respond by substituting child labour for
credit. The credit route in Tanzania therefore seems to have been an important trans-
mission mechanism for the global financial crisis.
Two policy implications follow from these results. First, policies designed to ease
household access to credit have the potential to reduce child labour and increase school
attendance, particularly in times of financial crises. Second, in such crisis periods, par-
ticular attention needs to be given by policy makers to not only the credit circumstances
of rural households but also to households with income levels above the poverty line.
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